No. 12-399
In the
Supreme
Court of the United States
_______________
Adoptive
Couple,
Petitioners,
v.
Baby
Girl, a minor under the age of fourteen years, Birth Father, and The Cherokee
Nation,
Respondents
_______________
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of South Carolina
_______________
brief of amicus curiae Christian alliance for indian child welfare
in support of petitioners
_______________
Jon Metropoulos
Counsel of Record
Metropoulos Law Firm, PLLC
50 South
Last Chance Gulch
Suite 4
Helena,
Montana 59601
406-442-0285
jon@metropouloslaw.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae Christian Alliance for Indian Child Welfare
table of contents
TABLE OF
AUTHORITIES ......................................... iv
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE .............................. 1
SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT ........................................ 4
ARGUMENT ...................................................................... 6
1.
The
statutory and constitutional issues addressed in this case impact Indian
children in foster care............................................................................ 6
2.
To
the extent ICWA applies to an Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s
reservation, it violates the equal protection, due process, liberty, and state
rights provisions of the federal constitution.................................................................................. 11
A.
To
the extent ICWA applies to an Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s
reservation, it violates the equal protection provisions of the federal
constitution.................................. 11
B.
To
the extent ICWA applies to an Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s
reservation, it violates the due process and liberty provisions of the federal
constitution........................... 19
C.
To
the extent ICWA applies to an Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s
reservation, it violates the state rights provisions of the federal
constitution................................................ 22
D.
Because
Baby Girl was domiciled off Indian land, the application of ICWA to her
violates the federal constitution 24
3.
An
Indian child’s best interests should be considered in every “good cause” and
other determination under ICWA, particularly when the child is domiciled off
the tribe’s reservation. There is no
presumption that residing with members of an Indian child’s tribe is in the
child’s best interests, particularly when the child is domiciled off the
tribe’s reservation................. 25
4.
If
ICWA applies to an Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s reservation, then it
applies only if the child is part of an existing Indian family or environment.......................................................... 30
5.
A
tribe lacks inherent jurisdiction over a nonmember. To the extent ICWA applies to the parent of
an Indian child, which parent is not a member of the tribe, then it violates
the equal protection provision of the federal constitution, even if the parent
domiciles on the tribe’s reservation 33
CONCLUSION ................................................................ 36
table of
authorities
Cases
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
731 S.E. 2d 550 (S.C. 2012).............. 6, 13, 25, 30, 33
Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224 (1998) ................................................... 11
Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).................................................... 13
Bruce L. v. W.E.,
247 P.3d 966 (Alaska 2011)..................................... 12
Clark v. Suarez,
542 U.S. 371 (2005).................................................... 11
Crystal R. v. Super. Ct. of Santa
Cruz Cnty.,
69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
............. 32
In re Adoption of Baby Girl B.,
67 P.3d 359 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003)......................... 27
In re Adoption of S.W.,
41 P.3d 1003 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001)...................... 27
In re Adoption of T.R.M.,
525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988)................................ 24, 31
In re A.E.,
572 N.W.2d 579
(Iowa 1997).................................... 27
In re A.R.,
No.
11CA1448, 2012 Colo. App. LEXIS 2144 (Colo. App., Nov, 8, 2012) 27
In re A.T.W.S.,
899 P.2d 223, 224 (Colo. App. 1994)....................... 27
In re Baby Boy C.,
805 N.Y.S.2d 313
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005)................. 32
In re C.E.H.,
837 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)....................... 31
In re Guardianship of J.O.,
743 A.2d 341
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)..... 27
In re Hampton,
658 So. 2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1995).......................... 31
In re J.L.,
779 N.W.2d 481 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009).................... 27
In re K.L.D.R.,
No.
M2008-00897-COA-R#-PT, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 163 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) 32
In re L.S.,
812 N.W.2d 505 (S.D. 2012)..................................... 12
In re Morgan,
No. 02A01-9608-CH-00206, 1997 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) .......................... 32
In re N.J.,
221 P.3d 1255 (Nev. 2009)................................. 27, 31
In re S.A.M.,
703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)....................... 32
In re Zylena R.,
825 N.W.2d 173
(Neb. 2012).................................... 27
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
490 U.S. 30 (1989)............................ 16, 17, 21, 26, 27
Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974)....................................... 13,
14, 15
Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1980).................................................... 34
Navaho Nation v. Arizona Dep’t of
Econ. Sec.,
284 P.3d 29 (Ct. App. Ariz. 2012)............................ 27
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978)................................................... 34
Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429 (1984)............................................. 16,
28
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist.
No.
1,
551 U.S. 701 (2007)........................................ 18
Rice v. Cayetano,
528 U.S. 495 (2000)............................................. 17,
18
Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609
(1984)............................................. 19,
20
Rose v. Rose,
481 U.S. 619 (1987).................................................... 22
Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991).................................................... 11
Rye v. Weasel,
934 S.W.2d 257
(Ky. 1996)................................. 31,
32
S.A. v. E.J.P.,
571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).................... 32
Saint Francis College v.
Al-Khazraji,
481 U.S. 604 (1987).................................................... 17
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families
for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) 20
Constitutional
Provisions
U.S. Const. amend
V................................................. 18,
19
U.S. Const. amend X ....................................................... 22
U.S. Const. amend XIV § 1................................ 12, 18,
19
Statutes
8 U.S.C. §
1401(b) ............................................................ 19
18 U.S.C. § 1151 .............................................................. 16
25 U.S.C. § 479.................................................................. 12
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963..................................................... 1
25 U.S.C. § 1901(5).................................................... 16,
31
25 U.S.C. § 1902 ........................................... 20, 26, 28, 31
25 U.S.C. § 1903............................................................. 6,
7
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) .......................................................... 12
25 U.S.C. § 1903(9)........................................................... 34
25 U.S.C. § 1903(10)........................................................ 16
25 U.S.C. §§ 1911-1923 .................................................. 20
25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) .................................. 7, 16,
21, 23, 34
25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) .................................. 7, 21,
23, 26, 34
25 U.S.C. § 1911(c)............................................................. 7
25 U.S.C. § 1912............................................................. 6,
7
25 U.S.C. § 1913............................................................. 6,
7
25 U.S.C. §1915 ....................................................... 6, 7,
26
42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679c ..................................................... 10
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16)...................................................... 10
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)............................................................. 10
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C)....................................................... 10
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)....................................................... 10
Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978)..................... 15
Treatises
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian
Law (Nell
Jessup Newton
ed., 2012)......................................... 12
Other
Materials
Children’s Bureau, United States
Department of Health and Human Services,
The AFCARS Report No. 19 (July 2012)...................... 8
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386 (1978).................................. 15, 23
INTEREST
OF AMICUS CURIAE[1]
Amicus curiae Christian Alliance for Indian
Child Welfare (“Alliance”) is a Montana nonprofit corporation with
approximately 400 members in 35 states, including South Carolina. Alliance was formed, in part, to: (1) promote human rights for all United
States citizens and residents; (2) educate the public about Indian rights,
laws, and issues; and (3) encourage accountability of governments, particularly
the federal government, to families with Indian ancestry.
Alliance
seeks to help and protect the human, civil, and constitutional rights of all
Americans, especially those of Native American ancestry, through education,
outreach, and legal defense. One area of
constitutional concern is the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§
1901-1963 (“ICWA”).
Alliance
is particularly concerned for families with members of Indian ancestry who have
been denied the full range of rights and protections of federal and state
constitutions when subjected to tribal jurisdiction. Alliance is interested in this case because
its members are birth parents, birth relatives, foster parents, and adoptive
parents of children with varying amounts of Indian ancestry – all of whom have
seen or experienced the tragic consequences of applying the racial distinctions
embedded in ICWA.
Tribal
jurisdiction, whether regulatory or judicial, affects the parental, fundamental,
and constitutional rights of United States citizens in many cases. These citizens include individuals of Indian
ancestry who are not members of a federally recognized tribe, who have had no
contact with a federally recognized tribe, and/or who have no desire for a political
or other relationship with a federally recognized tribe.
These
citizens also include individuals who are members of a tribe, but have chosen
to live, work, and domicile beyond the borders of their tribe’s reservation,
sometimes for the express purpose of avoiding entanglement with their tribal
government. They purposefully choose not
to domicile within the confines of tribal government and intend for their
Indian children to live and be raised outside tribal government.
Some
citizens of non-Indian ancestry have no connection to tribal government, but have
knowingly or unknowingly given birth to a child of some Indian ancestry. They often intentionally domicile off the
tribe’s reservation. They intend for
their Indian children to live and be raised outside tribal government.
Alliance
believes that the following argument will bring to the Court’s attention
relevant matter not already brought to the Court’s attention by the parties.
If
affirmed, this case will further the chilling realization by state foster care
and adoptive families of the possibility that a biological parent of an Indian
child with minimal Indian ancestry may seek custody of the child under ICWA –
outside the relevant state child custody law.
A biological parent considering foster care or adoption as being in the
best interests of their Indian child will face the horrifying uncertainty of
whether it is safe to terminate their parental rights. Innocent Indian children, bonded and attached
to their foster or adoptive families, face the danger of being torn from the
homes and families and forced into the custody of strangers.
Alliance
also believes that an Indian child’s best interests are not inherently served
through a forced political relationship with the child’s tribe, and forced
familial relationships with members of the tribe. A person’s ancestry does not determine the
person’s values, emotions, motivations, skills, and inclinations. Numerous multi-racial children throughout the
nation have been negatively affected by the application of the ICWA. Shockingly, Indian children who have never domiciled
on, or been near, their tribe’s reservation, nor involved in tribal customs or
culture, are routinely removed from homes they love and placed with strangers. Sometimes, because of the racially based
preferences embedded in ICWA, they are placed in homes that would be deemed
unsafe for children of other ancestry.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Many
of the ICWA sections addressed in this case impact Indian children in foster
care, as well as Indian children not in foster care. While the case involves an adopted Indian
child who was never in foster care, its resolution will impact: (1) foster care placements of Indian
children, (2) terminations of parental rights involving Indian children in
foster care, (3) preadoptive placements for Indian children in foster care, and
(4) adoptive placements of Indian children in foster care.
To
the extent ICWA applies to an Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s
reservation, it applies based upon ancestry – which is a proxy for race. Because this application is racially discriminatory
and not narrowly tailored, it unconstitutionally denies the Indian child equal
protection of the laws.
To
the extent ICWA applies to an Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s
reservation, it deprives the Indian child and parents of their liberty interest
and due process rights to domicile off the tribe’s reservation, and to be
subject to state law and jurisdiction – instead of tribal law and
jurisdiction. This deprivation is based
upon race and is unconstitutional.
To
the extent ICWA applies to an Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s
reservation, it overrides state law and jurisdiction governing child care and
custody. This unconstitutionally
violates the right reserved to states to govern child care and custody.
Courts
interpreting and applying ICWA have differed in the extent they consider an
Indian child’s best interests. A child’s
best interests, however, should be considered in every ICWA determination,
particularly when the child is domiciled off the tribe’s
reservation. There is no presumption
that residing with members of an Indian child’s tribe is in the child’s best
interests, particularly when the child is domiciled off the tribe’s
reservation.
As
held by some courts, ICWA applies only when an Indian child is removed from an
existing Indian family and environment.
If ICWA applies to an Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s
reservation, then it applies only if the child has significant cultural,
social, and political contacts with the tribe.
If
a parent of an Indian child is not a member of the child’s tribe, then the
tribe lacks inherent jurisdiction over the parent, even if the parent domiciles
on the reservation. To the extent ICWA
applies to the parent, it violates the equal protection provision of the
federal constitution.
ARGUMENT
Among other things, this case
involves the definition of a “parent” under ICWA, the voluntary and involuntary
termination of parental rights under ICWA, a voluntary adoptive placement under
ICWA, and the adoptive placement preferences under ICWA. See
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731
S.E. 2d 550 (S.C. 2012) and 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1903, 1912, 1913, 1915. More
importantly, this case addresses whether the application of ICWA violates the
federal constitution.
1.
The statutory and constitutional
issues addressed in this case impact Indian children in foster care.
While
this case centers on “adoption” and not “foster care,” the sections of ICWA
addressed in this case impact Indian children in foster care, as well as Indian
children not in foster care. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1903, 1912, 1913,
1915. The resolution of this case,
therefore, will impact: (1) foster care
placements of Indian children, (2) terminations of parental rights involving
Indian children in foster care, (3) preadoptive placements for Indian children
in foster care, and (4) adoptive placements of Indian children in foster care.
In addition, the resolution of
this case may impact sections of ICWA not addressed or disputed in this
case. These sections impact Indian
children in foster care. For example,
ICWA grants an Indian tribe exclusive jurisdiction over any child custody
proceeding involving an Indian child “who resides or is domiciled within the
reservation of such tribe.” Id. §
1911(a). It also states that, absent
good cause to the contrary, parental objection, and declination of tribal
jurisdiction, a state court must transfer a state foster care placement or
termination of parental rights proceeding involving an Indian child “not
domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian child’s tribe” to
the jurisdiction of the tribe. Id.
§ 1911(b). ICWA also permits an Indian
tribe to intervene in a state foster care placement or termination of parental
rights proceeding “at any point in the proceeding.” Id. § 1911(c).
More importantly, the federal
constitutional issues addressed in this case impact Indian children in foster
care, as well as Indian children not in foster care.
As
of September 30, 2011, there were approximately 8,000 American Indian and
Native Alaskan children in foster care.
Children’s Bureau, United States Department of Health and Human
Services, The AFCARS Report No. 19
(July 2012), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/resource/afcars-report-19. Between October 1, 2010 and September 30,
2011, approximately 5,200 American Indian and Native Alaskan children entered
foster care, and approximately 4,650 exited foster care. Id.
As of September 30, 2011, approximately 1,850 American Indian and Native
Alaskan children in foster care were waiting to be adopted. Id.
Many
cases involving ICWA and foster care children occur in state courts, are not
appealed, and are not reported on an electronic legal database. Yet, for the 2012 calendar year, a simple
LEXIS search of state and federal cases mentioning “ICWA” and having a
core-term of “foster” resulted in over 100 cases. And, many cases involving ICWA and foster
care children are currently pending.
For
example, one state court of appeals is currently considering a case involving a
31-month old Indian child in foster care.
The child entered foster care at approximately 9 months of age. The child and biological parents are
domiciled over 1,000 miles from the Indian tribe’s reservation. Pursuant to ICWA, the Indian tribe was notified
when the child entered foster care, and was notified of all child custody
proceedings.
After a juvenile court terminated
the biological parents’ rights, during an appeal to a superior trial court, and
approximately 16 months after the child entered foster care, the tribe
intervened. Approximately 17 months
after the child entered foster care, the tribe moved to transfer jurisdiction
to tribal court.
The trial court granted the motion
to transfer. The guardian ad litem moved
to stay the transfer pending appeal.
During a hearing on the motion to stay, two experts testified that,
because of multiple moves and trauma during the child’s first 9-months, the
Indian child suffered from inhibited reactive attachment disorder. Because the case involves legal questions of
first impression in the state, and because there was “overwhelming” evidence
that transferring physical custody would irreparably harm the child, the trial
court stayed the transfer pending appeal.
Again, many cases involving ICWA
and foster care children are currently pending.
They need direction from the Court regarding application of ICWA.
Unless a tribe acts immediately
upon an Indian child entering foster care, applying ICWA to the child may
extend the child’s time in foster care, may prohibit or inhibit non-Indians
from fostering and/or adopting the child, and may delay the child’s
adoption. This is particularly true when
the tribe delays intervening or moving to transfer the proceeding, which is
more likely the further the child is domiciled from the tribe’s reservation.
In addition, a delay caused by
applying ICWA to an Indian child in foster care may jeopardize federal
financial assistance related to the child.
Title IV-E of the Social Security Act provides foster care financial
assistance to states with an approved “plan” meeting certain minimum
requirements. 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679c. Among other things, the plan must have a
“case review system” meeting certain minimum requirements. Id. §§ 671(a)(16), 675(5). The case review system must, among other
things, assure that a permanency hearing for a child in foster care is held no
later than 12 months after the child entered foster care. Id. § 675(5)(C). In addition, the case review system must
assure that, in general, if a child has been in foster care for 15 of the most
recent 22 months, then the state must petition to terminate parental rights and
pursue adoption. Id. § 675(5)(E).
A delay caused by applying ICWA to
an Indian child in foster care may result in missing these deadlines and
jeopardizing federal foster care assistance.
Whether for logistical, geographical, or other reasons, the likelihood
of a delay caused by applying ICWA is greater when the Indian child is
domiciled off the tribe’s reservation.
A statute must be applied in a
manner that is constitutional and that avoids “grave doubts” about its
constitutionality. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 191 (1991) and Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523
U.S. 224, 237 (1998). Likewise, a
statute must be applied in a manner that avoids constitutional problems, “whether
or not those constitutional problems pertain to the particular litigant before
the Court.” Clark v. Suarez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-81 (2005).
As discussed below, applying ICWA
to an Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s reservation violates the federal
constitution. This is true for the
adopted Indian child before the Court, and for Indian children in foster care.
2.
To the extent ICWA applies to an
Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s reservation, it violates the
equal protection, due process, liberty, and state rights provisions of the
federal constitution.
A.
To the extent ICWA applies to an
Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s reservation, it violates the
equal protection provisions of the federal constitution.
Under
the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, a person may not be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1. Under
ICWA, an “Indian child” is an unmarried person under age eighteen who is: (1) a member of an Indian tribe or (2)
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
member. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). The Indian tribe determines whether the child
is a member, or eligible for membership.
See In re L.S., 812 N.W.2d 505, 509 (S.D. 2012); Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966, 975 (Alaska 2011); and Cohen’s Handbook of Federal
Indian Law §§ 4.01(2)(b), 11.02(2) (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012)
[hereinafter, Cohen’s Handbook].
Tribal
membership is typically based upon: (1)
a specified degree of ancestry from an individual on a base list or roll and/or
(2) domicile at birth. Cohen’s
Handbook, supra at 3.03(2); See also 25 U.S.C. § 479 (as used in the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, “Indian” includes Indian descendants who are
tribal members and their descendants residing within a reservation, and all
other individuals of one-half or more Indian blood). The required degree of ancestry or percentage
of blood quantum varies widely, with some tribes permitting any descendant,
regardless of blood quantum. Cohen’s
Handbook, supra at 3.03(2). Tribal membership, therefore, is based upon
ancestry or domicile.
Baby
Girl’s biological father (“Birth Father”) is 3/128th Cherokee blood quantum,
although he seems to have had some uncertainty or ambivalence regarding his
ancestry and tribal membership. Brief
for Guardian Ad Litem, as Representative of Respondent Baby Girl, Supporting
Reversal at 18, n. 6. Interestingly,
Birth Father’s initial legal pleading stated that neither he nor Baby Girl had
“Native American blood.” Adoptive Couple, supra at 555. Approximately
three months later, Birth Father amended the pleading to state that both he and
Baby Girl had “Native American blood.” Id.
at 555 n. 12.
Baby
Girl’s biological mother (“Birth Mother”) is not a member of the Cherokee
Nation. Id. at 552, 554 n.
5. Baby Girl is 3/256th Cherokee blood
quantum and is a member of, or eligible for membership in, the Cherokee
Nation. Br. for G.A.L., supra at 18, n. 6 and Adoptive Couple, supra at 555, 560 n. 18.
In
1954, the Court held that segregation based upon race violated the equal
protection provision of the federal constitution. Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
In 1974,
the Court held that a Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) employment preference
for Indians was not “racial discrimination.”
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 553 (1974). Instead it was a
preference “granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as
members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities.”
Id. at 554. At that time,
the Court opined that without this so-called political distinction, a large
body of federal statutes granting special treatment for Indians “living on or
near reservations” would be “effectively erased.” Id. at 552. The Court noted the Indian preference was
similar to legal requirements that elected officials inhabit or reside within
geographic areas related to their offices.
Id. at 554. Since Morton, the Court’s jurisprudence,
including decisions specifying the narrow limits of tribal governmental
jurisdiction, draws into question the accuracy and legitimacy of this concern,
particularly when contrasted with the rights of individuals.
In Morton, the Court held that the Indian
preference was “reasonably and directly related to a legitimate, nonracially
based goal,” which is the “principal characteristic” generally absent from
prohibited racial discrimination. Id.
at 554. The Court noted that on
“numerous occasions” it had upheld legislation singling out Indians for special
treatment. The cases cited by the Court
involved real estate tax immunity on an Indian homestead, inheritance of
reservation land, regulation of affairs on a reservation, and federal benefits
for Indians living “on or near” a reservation.
Id. at 554-55.
In other
parts of its opinion, the Court noted that a reason for the preference was to
facilitate Indian BIA employees participating in or affecting “various services
on the Indian reservations.” Id.
at 543-44. The Court also noted the “unique
legal status” of tribal and “reservation-based” activities, and maters
concerning tribal or “‘on or near’ reservation” employment. Id. at 546, 548.
In
Morton, therefore, a primary
consideration for the Court’s finding that the Indian preference or special
treatment was racially neutral – and constitutional – was its application to
Indians living on or near their reservation.
Otherwise, the preference or special treatment was racially discriminatory
and unconstitutional.
Recognizing
this reasoning, when Congress considered and enacted ICWA in 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978), the United States Department of Justice
(“Department”) noted, “The class of persons whose rights under the bill may, in
our opinion, constitutionally be circumscribed by this legislation are the
members of a tribe, whether living on or near a reservation.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386 at 36 (1978) (emphasis
supplied).
In
addressing whether ICWA could constitutionally apply to individuals not living
on Indian lands or the reservation, the House of Representatives Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs noted three Court cases. These cases, however, were criminal cases
addressing the power of Congress to regulate commerce with Indian tribes. They did not involve racial
discrimination. Id. at 15.
In
enacting ICWA, Congress intended to protect tribal communities and the
participation of Indian children in tribal communities. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) and Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30, 37 (1989). By definition, a
“community” includes individuals domiciled near one another.
For
purposes of ICWA, the term “reservation” means:
(1) “Indian country” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and (2) other land,
title to which is: (a) held by the
United States in trust for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or (b)
held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to a restriction by the United
States against alienation. 25 U.S.C. §
1903(10). As noted by the Court,
“reservation” is defined “quite broadly” in ICWA. Holyfield,
supra at 42.
In
1984, the Court reversed a child custody determination based upon race because
it violated the equal protection provision of the federal constitution. Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
In 1989,
the Court addressed the meaning of the term “domiciled” within a reservation as
used in the exclusive jurisdiction section of ICWA. Holyfield,
supra; See also 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a).
It held that domicile is “not necessarily” the same as residence. For example, the domicile of most minor
children is the domicile of their parents.
The domicile of an illegitimate child is the domicile of the child’s
mother. Id. at 48-49.
Because
it was “undisputed” that the biological mother was domiciled on the tribe’s
reservation, the Court held the Indian children in the case were domiciled on
the reservation. Id. at 48-49,
53. Because the Indian children were
domiciled on their reservation, the Court had no reason to address whether the
application of ICWA was racially discriminatory.
In 2000,
the Court held that a requirement limiting voting in a Hawaiian election to
individuals with specific ancestry was an unconstitutional racial
discrimination. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, (2000). The Court explained that ancestry can be a
“proxy” for race, and can be used “as a racial definition and for a racial
purpose.” Id. at 514. Indeed, “racial discrimination” singles out
persons “solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.” Id. at 515 (citing Saint Francis College
v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613, (1987)).
As
the Court added, “The ancestral inquiry mandated by the State implicates the
same grave concerns as a classification specifying a particular race by name.” Id. at 517. The Court described race as a “forbidden
classification” because it “demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be
judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.” Id. Inquiring into “ancestral lines is not
consistent with respect based on the unique personality each of us possesses, a
respect the Constitution itself secures in its concern for persons and
citizens.” Id.
In
holding the requirement unconstitutional, the Court expressly refused to expand
its holding in Morton. Id. at 518-22. The Court added that the failure of a class
defined by ancestry to include all members of the race does not make the classification
race neutral. Id. at 517.
In
2007, the Court noted that it is “well settled” that when government distributes
burdens or benefits on the basis of race, the action is reviewed under strict
scrutiny. The use of race must be
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. Otherwise, the use is an unconstitutional
violation of due process and equal protection.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007); See also U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV, § 1. Indeed, “Distinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.” Id. at 745-46. A child born in the United States to a member
of an Indian tribe is a United States citizen.
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1 and
8 U.S.C. § 1401(b).
To the
extent an “Indian child” under ICWA is determined based upon Indian ancestry
and domicile on the tribe’s reservation, then the determination is
narrowly tailored and may not violate the equal protection provisions of the
federal constitution. However, to the
extent the determination is based upon Indian ancestry and not domicile on the
tribe’s reservation, then it is racially based, is not narrowly tailored, and
violates the equal protection provision of the federal constitution.
Accordingly, to the extent ICWA applies to an Indian child
domiciled off the tribe’s reservation, it violates the equal protection
provision of the federal constitution.
B.
To the extent ICWA applies to an
Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s reservation, it violates the due
process and liberty provisions of the federal constitution.
Under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution, a person may
not be deprived of liberty without due process of law. U.S. Const. amends V, XIV § 1. Freedom of association, and freedom of
choice, associated with family relationships are personal liberty interests
protected by the federal constitution. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
617-20 (1984) and Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for
Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842-47 (1977).
As noted
by the Court, “[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” Smith,
supra at 843. Likewise, the personal relationships and
affiliations regarding the “creation and sustenance of a family,” like
marriage, childbirth, and the raising and education of children are
protected. Roberts, supra at
619. They are entitled to a “substantial
measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by” state or federal
government. Id. at 618.
ICWA
includes extensive provisions and heightened standards regarding foster care
placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement, and adoptive
placement proceedings. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1902, 1911-1923.
As noted
above, ICWA grants an Indian tribe exclusive jurisdiction over a child custody
proceeding involving an Indian child domiciled on the tribe’s
reservation. It also permits transfer to
tribal jurisdiction of a state foster care placement or termination of parental
rights proceeding involving an Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s
reservation. While a parent of the
Indian child may object to and prevent the transfer, the Indian child may not
object to or prevent the transfer. 25
U.S.C. § 1911(b). That is, if an Indian
child has a guardian ad litem to protect the child’s best interests, then the
guardian ad litem may not object to or prevent the transfer.
A
fundamental liberty right of families is determining where to domicile, and to
what local law and jurisdiction to be subject.
If an Indian parent and child decide to domicile on the tribe’s
reservation, and be subject to tribal law and jurisdiction, then their
liberty interest protects this right. Likewise,
if an Indian parent or child decides to domicile off the tribe’s
reservation, and be subject to state law and jurisdiction, then their
liberty interests protect this right.
Otherwise, the Indian parent and child would have no freedom to leave
the reservation and tribal law and jurisdiction.
In
Holyfield, the Court noted that the
law of domicile cannot permit an individual “reservation-domiciled” tribal
member to defeat the tribe’s exclusive jurisdiction. Holyfield,
supra at 53; See also 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a).
The liberty interest of an Indian parent and child, however, permits
them to domicile off the reservation to defeat the tribe’s jurisdiction.
If
ICWA applies to an Indian parent and child domiciled on the tribe’s
reservation, then it may not violate their personal liberty rights. If, however, ICWA applies to an Indian parent
and child domiciled off the tribe’s reservation, then it violates their
liberty interests. Otherwise, the Indian
parent and child could never escape the application of ICWA and tribal
jurisdiction, even though domiciling off the tribe’s reservation.
Accordingly,
to the extent ICWA applies to an Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s
reservation, it violates the due process and liberty provisions of the federal
constitution.
C.
To the extent ICWA applies to an
Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s reservation, it violates the
state rights provisions of the federal constitution.
Under
the tenth amendment to the federal constitution, powers not delegated to the
federal government, nor prohibited by it to the states, are “reserved to the
States.” U.S. Const. amend X. As the Court has “consistently recognized,”
the law governing domestic relations between parent and child is reserved to
the states, and not the federal government.
Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619,
625 (1987). Before a state law governing
these domestic relations is overridden, it “must do ‘major damage’ to ‘clear
and substantial’ federal interests.” Id.
Standards
and protections regarding child care and custody have traditionally been
addressed by the states, and not by the federal government. ICWA, however, includes extensive provisions
and heightened standards regarding child custody proceedings. It also grants an Indian tribe exclusive
jurisdiction over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child “who
resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a). It also addresses the transfer of a state
foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding involving an
Indian child “not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian
child’s tribe.” Id. § 1911(b).
Applying
state law and jurisdiction to child custody proceedings involving an
Indian child domiciled on a reservation may do major damage to federal
interests. To the extent ICWA applies to
an Indian child domiciled on the tribe’s reservation, it may
constitutionally override state law and jurisdiction. However, applying state law and
jurisdiction to child custody proceedings involving an Indian child domiciled off
the tribe’s reservation, but within the state, does not do major damage to a
clear and substantial federal interest.
To the extent ICWA applies to an Indian child domiciled off the
tribe’s reservation, it may not constitutionally override state law or
jurisdiction.
Agreeing,
and as noted during congressional consideration of ICWA, the Department of
Justice thought that Congress could override state law when addressing
“reservation Indians.” H.R. Rep. No.
95-1386 at 40 (1978); See also In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d
298, 303 n. 1 (Ind. 1988). The
Department, however, was not convinced that Congress’ power to control
litigation involving “nonreservation Indian children and parents” under the
Indian commerce clause was “sufficient to override the significant State
interest in regulating the procedure to be followed by its courts in exercising
State jurisdiction over what is a traditionally State matter.” Id.
It seemed to the Department that the “Federal interest in the
off-reservation context is so attenuated that the 10th Amendment and
general principles of federalism preclude the wholesale invasion of State power
contemplated by [ICWA].” Id.
As
noted above, the Court held that the Indian children in Holyfield were domiciled on their reservation. The Court, therefore, had no reason to
address whether the application of ICWA violated the tenth amendment to the
federal constitution.
Accordingly,
to the extent ICWA applies to an Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s
reservation, it violates the state rights provisions of the federal
constitution.
D.
Because Baby Girl was domiciled off
Indian land, the application of ICWA to her violates the federal constitution.
Birth
Father’s family “had Indian land” in Oklahoma.
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, supra at 565. Baby Girl’s biological parents (“Birth
Parents”), however, were not married. Id.
at 552-53. As noted above, the domicile
of an illegitimate child is the domicile of the child’s mother. As an illegitimate child, Baby Girls’
domicile is Birth Mother’s domicile.
Because
Birth Parents did not live together before Baby Girl’s birth, and because of
their “strained” and later broken relationship, Birth Mother was not domiciled
on the Indian land. Id. at
553. Because neither Birth Father nor
his parents contacted Birth Mother while she was hospitalized for Baby Girl’s
birth, and because Birth Father did not see Baby Girl for approximately 4
months after her birth, Baby Girl was not domiciled on the Indian land. Id. at 554-55. Baby Girl, therefore, was not domiciled on a
“reservation” under ICWA.
Accordingly,
because Baby Girl was domiciled off Indian land, the application of ICWA
to her violates the federal constitution.
3.
An Indian child’s best interests
should be considered in every “good cause” and other determination under ICWA,
particularly when the child is domiciled off the tribe’s reservation. There is no presumption that residing with
members of an Indian child’s tribe is in the child’s best interests,
particularly when the child is domiciled off the tribe’s reservation.
As noted
above, under ICWA, in a state court proceeding for the foster care placement
of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child domiciled off the
tribe’s reservation, the state court must transfer the proceeding to tribal
jurisdiction, “in the absence of good cause to the contrary.” 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). Also under ICWA, in any foster care,
preadoptive placement, or adoptive placement of an Indian child, preferences
are given, “in the absence of good cause to the contrary.” Id. § 1915(a),(b).
Also
under ICWA, Congress declared that it is the Nation’s policy to: (1) protect the best interests of Indian
children and (2) promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families. 25 U.S.C. § 1902. The meaning of this declaration is expressed
by the ordinary meaning of the words used.
Holyfield, supra at 47. Based upon the ordinary meaning of the words
used, the Nation has two policies. The
first is protecting the best interests of Indian children. The second is promoting the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families.
They are separate policies. While
the policies may, or may not, overlap, they are separate and distinct policies.
In a
footnote, the Holyfield Court agreed
with a state court that ICWA is based on the “fundamental assumption that it is
in the Indian child’s best interest that its relationship to the tribe be
protected.” Holyfield, supra at 50 n.
24. Based upon this and other statements
in Holyfield: (1)
state courts have disagreed whether a Indian child’s best interests may
be considered in determining whether “good cause to the contrary” exists to
deny transfer of jurisdiction or to deviate from placement preferences, see, e.g., In re Zylena R., 284 Neb. 834, 849-52, 825 N.W.2d 173 (Neb. 2012) and cases cited therein; In re J.L., 779 N.W.2d 481, 486-87 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2009) and cases cited therein;
In re Adoption of Baby Girl B., 67
P.3d 359, 370-72 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003); In
re Adoption of S.W., 41 P.3d 1003, 1009-10 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001) and cases cited therein; In re Guardianship of J.O., 743 A.2d
341, 348-49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) and cases cited therein; and
In re A.E., 572 N.W.2d 579, 583-85
(Iowa 1997) and cases cited therein,
and (2) state courts have held that protecting an Indian child’s relationship
with the tribe is presumed to be in the child’s best interests, see, i.e., Navaho Nation v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 284 P.3d 29, 35-36
(Ct. App. Ariz. 2012); In re A.R., No. 11CA1448, 2012 Colo. App.
LEXIS 2144, 7 (Colo. App., Nov, 8, 2012); and
In re A.T.W.S., 899 P.2d 223, 224 (Colo. App. 1994).
An
Indian child, however, is the subject of rights, and not the object
of rights. That is, an Indian child has
the right for his or her best interests to be protected and promoted. An Indian child is not the object of the
tribe’s rights, particularly when the child is domiciled off the tribe’s
reservation. The rights of an
Indian child are different from the rights to the child. The rights of an Indian child include having
his or her best interests protected and promoted. Those rights are different from the tribe’s
right to the child, particularly when the child is domiciled off the
tribe’s reservation.
As
noted by the Court, a child’s welfare is the “controlling factor” in child
custody decisions. Palmore, supra at
432. Likewise, a state has a “duty of
the highest order” to protect a child’s best interests, particularly for a
child “of tender years.” Id. at
433. Granting custody based upon a
child’s best interests is “indisputably a substantial government interest” for
equal protection purposes. Id.
The
inability to consider an Indian child’s best interests in making “good cause”
determinations, and presuming that residing with members of the child’s tribe
is in the child’s best interests, are inconsistent with ICWA. See
25 U.S.C. § 1902. The inability to
consider best interests, and the presumption, are particularly inappropriate
when an Indian child is domiciled off the tribe’s reservation.
Protecting
and promoting a child’s best interests are the paramount considerations in ICWA
and other child custody proceedings.
While not considering the best interests of an Indian child domiciled on
the tribe’s reservation in “good cause” determinations seems inappropriate, not
considering the best interests of a child domiciled off the reservation
seems even more inappropriate. By
domiciling off the tribe’s reservation, the Indian child’s parents presumably
believed that to be in the child’s best interests.
While
keeping an Indian child domiciled on the tribe’s reservation with the
tribe may presumptively be in the child’s best interests, this is not true for
an Indian child domiciled off the reservation. By definition, a child domiciled off the
reservation is not with his or her tribe or community, particularly if the
child is domiciled far off the reservation.
While facts and circumstances may indicate that returning an Indian
child domiciled off the tribe’s reservation to his or her tribe is in the
child’s best interests, this is not presumed.
If anything, there is a presumption that returning the Indian child is
not in his or her best interests.
In
the present case, the dissent noted, “It is apparent that the decision of the
family court judge was influenced to some extent by the erroneous legal
conclusion that ICWA eclipses the family court’s obligation to determine what
would be in the child's best interests.”
Adoptive Couple, supra at 579. The majority acknowledged the “settled
principle” that a child’s best interests is “primary, paramount and controlling”
in all child custody cases, but the majority “ignore[d] [the principle] in application.” Id.
Based upon the guardian ad litem’s testimony and report, and other
evidence, the dissent concluded that placing Baby Girl with her adoptive
parents would serve her best interests. Id.
at 580.
An
Indian child’s best interests should be considered in every “good cause” and
other determination under ICWA, particularly when the child is domiciled off
the tribe’s reservation. Because Baby
Girl is domiciled off the tribe’s reservation, her best interests should be
considered. There is no presumption that
residing with members of an Indian child’s tribe is in the child’s best
interests, particularly when the child is domiciled off the tribe’s
reservation. Because Baby Girl is
domiciled off the tribe’s reservation, there is no presumption that residing
with members of her tribe is in her best interests. As noted by the dissent, placing Baby Girl
with her adoptive parents is in her best interests.
4.
If ICWA applies to an Indian child
domiciled off the tribe’s reservation, then it applies only if the child
is part of an existing Indian family or environment.
As noted
in ICWA, Congress found that states often failed to recognize the “cultural and
social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.” 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5). Congress also declared that it is a national
policy to promote the “stability and security of Indian tribes and families” in
a manner that “reflect[s] the unique values of Indian culture.” Id. § 1902. ICWA, therefore, protects the culture,
values, and social standards “prevailing” in a tribe.
This
protection prevents the removal of an Indian child from a family or environment
“reflect[ing]” tribal culture, values, and social standards. ICWA, therefore, applies only when an Indian
child is being removed from a family or environment “reflect[ing]” tribal
culture, values, and social standards.
Agreeing,
some state courts have held that ICWA applies only when an Indian child is
being removed from an existing Indian family and environment. See
In re N.J., 221 P.3d 1255, 1264 (Nev.
2009); Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257,
262 (Ky. 1996) and In re Hampton, 658 So.2d 331, 334-37
(La. Ct. App. 1995); and In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d
298, 303 (Ind. 1988).
That is,
ICWA does not apply when an Indian child is not being removed from an Indian
cultural setting, the biological parents have no substantive ties to a tribe,
and neither biological parent resided or plans to reside within a reservation. In re
C.E.H., 837 S.W.2d 947, 951-52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); See also In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 608-09 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
ICWA
does not apply when an Indian child has minimal contact with the tribe’s
members, minimal contact with the tribe’s reservation, minimal involvement in the
tribe’s activities, and minimal participation in the tribe’s culture. S.A. v.
E.J.P., 571 So.2d 1187, 1189-90 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
ICWA
does not apply when an Indian child has had no contact with the tribe’s
reservation and the biological parents are domiciled off the tribe’s
reservation. In re K.L.D.R., No. M2008-00897-COA-R#-PT, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS
163, at 10-12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) and
In re Morgan, No.
02A01-9608-CH-00206, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 818, at 42-44 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
Courts disagree
whether Holyfield supports or opposes
the application of ICWA to an Indian child who is not part of an existing
Indian family or environment. See In
re Baby Boy C., 805 N.Y.S.2d 313, 319-23 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) and cases cited therein; In re Morgan, No. 02A01-9608-CH-00206,
1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 818, at 24-41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) and cases cited therein; Rye
v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262-63 (Ky. 1996) and cases cited therein; and
Crystal R. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Cruz
Cnty., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414, 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) and cases cited therein.
Through Holyfield, the Court
created confusion regarding the application of ICWA.
If ICWA
applies to an Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s reservation, then
it applies only if the child is part of an existing Indian family or
environment. The child must have
significant cultural, social, and political contacts with the tribe reflecting
the tribe’s unique values.
In the
present case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded that ICWA applies, regardless
of whether an Indian child is part of an existing Indian family or
environment. Adoptive Couple, supra at
558, n. 17. For the reasons discussed
above, however, ICWA must apply only to an Indian child domiciled on the
tribe’s reservation. If ICWA applies to
an Indian child domiciled off the tribe’s reservation, then it applies only if
the child is part of an existing Indian family or environment.
5.
A tribe lacks inherent
jurisdiction over a nonmember. To the
extent ICWA applies to the parent of an Indian child, which parent is not a
member of the tribe, then it violates the equal protection provision of the
federal constitution, even if the parent domiciles on the tribe’s reservation.
Under
ICWA, a “parent” means “any biological parent or parents of an Indian child or
any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9). As noted above, the child’s tribe has
exclusive jurisdiction over all child custody proceedings, and concurrent
jurisdiction over foster care placement and termination of parental rights
proceedings, involving the Indian child.
Id. § 1911(a),(b). As also
noted above, ICWA includes substantive provisions governing child custody
proceedings. As held by the Court,
however, a tribe generally lacks inherent jurisdiction over a nonmember. Montana
v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563-67 (1980); See also Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206-12 (1978).
While a
tribe retains inherent jurisdiction to “regulate domestic relations among
members,” this jurisdiction does not include domestic relations involving a
nonmember. Id. at 564. Likewise, while a tribe retains inherent
jurisdiction to regulate a nonmember’s consensual business relationships with
the tribe or its members, this jurisdiction does not include a nonmember’s
consensual personal relationships with the tribe or its members. Id. at 565. Further, while a tribe retains inherent
jurisdiction to regulate the conduct of nonmembers that threaten political
integrity, economic security, health, or welfare of the tribe, this
jurisdiction does not include the conduct of nonmembers that does not threaten
these areas. Id. at 566.
To the
extent ICWA applies to the parent of an Indian child, which parent is not a
member of the child’s tribe, it violates the equal protection provision of the
federal constitution. This is true even
if the parent is domiciled on the tribe’s reservation. As a United States citizen or resident, the
parent is entitled to the same protections afforded to other parents who are
not members of the tribe.
CONCLUSION
The
Court should reverse the Supreme Court of South Carolina holding.
Jon Metropoulos
Counsel of Record
Metropoulos Law Firm, PLLC
50 South
Last Chance Gulch
Suite 4
Helena,
Montana 59601
406-442-0285
jon@metropouloslaw.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae Christian Alliance for Indian Child Welfare
February 26, 2013
[1] No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part. No counsel for a party, or party, made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsels made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. All parties consented to the filing of this brief.