Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield – Christian Alliance for Indian Child Welfare

Indian Children: Citizens, not Cultural Artifacts

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Sep 292011

Washington DC, Friday, October 28, 2011

Indian Children: Citizens, not Cultural Artifacts: Supporting the Best Interest of Children –

CAICW will be holdging an ICWA “Teach-In” Friday, October 28, 2011, 9am – 1pm, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs Hearing Room, Wash, DC.
The Indian Child Welfare Act was passed in 1978 in effort to help prevent Native-American tribes and families from losing children to non-Native homes through foster care and adoption. Though well-intentioned, the Act is now harming children all across the country as courts and tribes place culture and tribal sovereignty above children’s basic needs for permanency and stability.

Come hear real stories of children whose lives have been impacted by the Indian Child Welfare Act. Listen to legal experts and scholars discuss the constitutionality of an Act that limits placement options and delays permanency for many of our nation’s most vulnerable children.

The sessions will include:

Initial Overview – The Mandate of Congress
a. Enforce the 14th Amendment
b. First, Do no Harm
c. Remedy Past Injustices

Session 1. ICWA is unconstitutional –
a. Dr. William B. Allen, Emeritus Professor, Political Science, MSU, will discuss Cohen v. Little Six; Granite Valley v. Jackpot Junction, Kiowa v. United Technologies, Choctaw v. Holyfield, and more.

Session 2. Congressional Intent –
a. Attorney O. Yale Lewis will discuss the legislative history of the ICWA and the changing history of the federal / Indian relationship.

Session 3. Political Status Claims threaten Citizenship –
a. Panel of affected families will share their family experience
b. Case studies on coerced enrollment will be presented.

Session 4. Cultural Heritage is a Data Point in Adoption Cases, not a Trump –
a. Who Decides when a citizen is an Indian; can race be politically attributed?
b. Restoring best interests of child as a consideration in adoptions.

Keynote: Dr. William Allen – Why We Must Act Now

JOIN US in support of the ‘Best Interest’ of Children — and THANK YOU!!
CONTACT LISA at WRITEUS@CAICW.ORG

Case Law for Existing Indian Family Doctrine

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May 112010

.Holyfield – the first case in which the federal high court has construed ICWA,

Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v. Holyfield, 490 US 30 (1989) Docket No. 87-980, Argued January 11, 1989, Decided April 3, 1989, CITATION: 490 U.S. 30, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989),

DISCUSSION: I A The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 92 Stat. 3069, 25 U.S.C. 1901-1963, was the product of rising concern in the mid-1970’s over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.

Dissenting footnotes: STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and KENNEDY, J., joined.

[ Footnote 8 ] The explanation of this subsection in the House Report reads as follows: “Subsection (b) directs a State court, having jurisdiction over an Indian child custody proceeding to transfer such proceeding, absent good cause to the contrary, to the appropriate tribal court upon the petition of the parents or the Indian tribe. Either parent is given the right to veto such transfer. The subsection is intended to permit a State court to apply a modified doctrine of forum non conveniens, in appropriate cases, to insure [490 U.S. 30, 61] that the rights of the child as an Indian, the Indian parents or custodian, and the tribe are fully protected.” Id., at 21. In commenting on the provision, the Department of Justice suggested that the section should be clarified to make it perfectly clear that a state court need not surrender jurisdiction of a child custody proceeding if the Indian parent objected. The Department of Justice letter stated:

“Section 101(b) should be amended to prohibit clearly the transfer of a child
placement proceeding to a tribal court when any parent or child over the age of
12 objects to the transfer.” Id., at 32.

Although the specific suggestion made by the Department of Justice was not in fact implemented, it is noteworthy that there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the recommended change was in any way inconsistent with any of the purposes of the statute.

[ Footnote 9 ] Chief Isaac elsewhere expressed a similar concern for the rights of parents with reference to another provision. See Hearing, supra n. 1, at 158 (statement on behalf of National Tribal Chairmen’s Association)

(“We believe the tribe should receive notice in all such cases but where the
child is neither a resident nor domiciliary of the reservation intervention
should require the consent of the natural parents or the blood relative in whose
custody the child has been left by the natural parents. It seems there is a
great potential in the provisions of section 101(c) for infringing parental
wishes and rights”).

But when an Indian child is deliberately abandoned by both parents to a person off the reservation, no purpose of the ICWA is served by closing the state courthouse door to them. The interests of the parents, the Indian child, and the tribe in preventing the unwarranted removal of Indian children from their families and from the reservation are protected by the Act’s substantive and procedural provisions. In addition, if both parents have intentionally invoked the jurisdiction of the state court in an action involving a non-Indian, no interest in tribal self-governance is implicated. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973); Williams v. [490 U.S. 30, 64] Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 -220 (1959); Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 332 (1892).

In Bridget R. –In re Bridget R. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1483 (Bridget R.). January 19, 1996 , LLR No. 9601041.CA, Cite as: LLR 1996.CA.41 – The Pomo Twins

[33] As we explain, recognition of the existing Indian family doctrine is necessary in a case such as this in order to preserve ICWA’s constitutionality. We hold that under the Fifth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, ICWA does not and cannot apply to invalidate a voluntary termination of parental rights respecting an Indian child who is not domiciled on a reservation, unless the child’s biological parent, or parents, are not only of American Indian descent, but also maintain a significant social, cultural or political relationship with their tribe.

[145] *fn11 We note in passing that Congress in 1987 failed to approve amendments to ICWA which were described in materials considered by the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs as having the effect of precluding application of the existing Indian family doctrine. (See Hearings before the Senate Select Com. on Indian Affairs, United States Senate, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. on Oversight Hearings on the Indian Child Welfare Act, Nov. 10, 1987, Appendix B, pp. 167-171.)

In re Alexandria Y.
(1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1483, –

which applied the “existing Indian family doctrine” to a proceeding to terminate parental rights and implement a pre-adoptive placement.

…., the Fourth District held that “recognition of the existing Indian family doctrine [was] necessary to avoid serious constitutional flaws in the ICWA” (In re Alexandria Y., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1493), and held that the trial court had acted properly in refusing to apply the ICWA “because neither [the child] nor [the mother] had any significant social, cultural, or political relationship with Indian life; thus, there was no existing Indian family to preserve.” (Id. at p. 1485.)

The court observed that not only did neither the mother nor the child have any relationship with the tribe, but also that the father was Hispanic, and that the child was placed in a preadoptive home where Spanish was spoken. “Under these circumstances,” the court commented, “it would be anomalous to allow the ICWA to govern the termination proceedings. It was clearly not the intent of the Congress to do so.” (Id. at p. 1494.)

From Santos y,
In re SANTOS Y., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law, In re Santos Y. (2001) , Cal.App.4th [No. B144822. Second Dist., Div. Two. July 20, 2001.]

“Application of the ICWA to a child whose only connection with an Indian tribe is a one-quarter genetic contribution does not serve the purpose for which the ICWA was enacted, “to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families” (25 U.S.C. § 1902).”

The court paid “particular attention to In re Bridget R., and quoted from Bridget R.’s due process and equal protection analysis at relative length.”

They also said, “We do not disagree with the proposition that preserving Native-American culture is a significant, if not compelling, governmental interest. We do not, however, see that interest being served by applying the ICWA to a multi-ethnic child who has had a minimal relationship with his assimilated parents, particularly when the tribal interests “can serve no purpose which is sufficiently compelling to overcome the child’s right to remain in the home where he . . . is loved and well cared for, with people to whom the child is daily becoming more attached by bonds of affection and among whom the child feels secure to learn and grow.” (In re Bridget R., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1508.)”

Finally, Santos states, “Congress considered amending the ICWA to preclude application of the “existing Indian family doctrine” but did not do so.”

RE: Santos Footnotes, – Existing Family Doctrine:

¬FN 15. Accepting the doctrine: Alabama (S.A. v. E.J.P. (Ala.Civ.App. 1990) 571 So.2d 1187); Indiana (Matter of Adoption of T.R.M. (Ind. 1988) 525 N.E.2d 298); Kansas (Matter of Adoption of Baby Boy L. (Kan. 1982) 643 P.2d 168); Kentucky (Rye v. Weasel (Ky. 1996) 934 S.W. 2d 257); Missouri (In Interest of S.A.M. (Mo.App. 1986) 703 S.W.2d 603); New York (In re Adoption of Baby Girl S. (Sur. 1999) 690 N.Y.S. 2d 907); Oklahoma (Matter of Adoption of Baby Boy D. (Ok. 1985) 742 P.2d 1059); Tennessee (In re Morgan (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997) WL 716880); Washington (Matter of Adoption of Crews (Wash. 1992) 825 P.2d 305).

Rejecting the doctrine: Alaska (Matter of Adoption of T.N.F. (Alaska 1989) 781 P.2d 973); Idaho (Matter of Baby Boy Doe (Idaho 1993) 849 P.2d 925); Illinois (In re Adoption of S.S. (Ill. 1995) 657 N.E.2d 935); New Jersey (Matter of Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage (N.J. 1988) 111 N.J. 155, 543 A.2d 925); South Dakota (Matter of Adoption of Baade (S.D. 1990) 462 N.W.2d 485); Utah (State, in Interest of D.A.C. (Utah App. 1997) 933 P.2d 993.)
United States Code Title 25 – Indians Chapter 21 – Indian Child Welfare

§ 1911. Indian tribe jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings(b) Transfer of proceedings; declination by tribal Court: In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian child’s tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child’s tribe: Provided, That such transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal court of such tribe.

(Ftn 1) “The 2000 Census indicated that as much at 66 percent of the American Indian and Alaska Native population live in urban areas,” the Senate Indian Affairs Committee wrote in a views and estimates letter on March 2 2007. http://www.indianz.com/News/2007/001803.asp
(ftn2) 14th Amendment, Section 1: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and therefore have all the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

ICWA Case Law & other Authority

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May 012010

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Cases:
Adoption of Lindsay C. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 404, 280 Cal.Rptr. 194
Doe v. Hughes, Thorness, Gantz, et al. (Alaska 1992) 838 P.2d 804
In re Alexandria Y. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1483, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 679
In re Alicia S. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 79, 76 Cal.Rprt.2d 121
In re Baby Girl A. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1611, 282 Cal.Rptr. 105
In re Brandon M. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1387, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 671
In re Bridget R. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1483, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 507
In re Charloe (Ore. 1982) 640 P.2d 608
In re Crystal K. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 655, 276 Cal.Rptr. 619
In re Crystal R. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 703, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 414.
In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App4th 828, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 742.
In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 688
In re John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 7 Cal.Rptr. 629
In re Jonathan D. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 105, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 628.
In re Julian B. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1337, modified by 83 Cal.App.4th 935A, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 241
In re Junious M. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 786, 193 Cal.Rptr. 40
In re Kahlen W. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1414, 285 Cal.Rptr. 507
In re Krystle D. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1778, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 132
In re Larissa G. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 505, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 16
In re Laura F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 583, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 859
In re Letitia V. v. Superior Court (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1009, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 303
In re Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 648
In re Marinna J. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731, 109 Cal.Rptr 2d 267
In re Matthew Z. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 545, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 343
In re Michael G. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 700, 74 Cal.Rprt.3d 642
In re Pedro N. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 183, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 507
In re Pima County Juvenile Action (Ariz. 1981) 635 P.2d 187
In re Richard S. 54 Cal.3d 857, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 2
In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 286 Cal.Rptr. 592
In re Robert T. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 657, 246 Cal.Rptr. 168
In re Santos Y. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1274, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 692, review denied (Feb. 13, 2002)
In re Wanomi P. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 156, 264 Cal.Rptr. 623
In re William G., Jr. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 423, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 436
Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v. Holyfield (1989) 490 U.S. 30, L.Ed.2d 29
Morton v. Mancari (1974) 417 U.S. 535
Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. State of Alaska (9th Cir. 1991) 944 F.2d 548
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49
Slone v. Inyo County (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 263, 282 Cal.Rptr. 126
State Ex Rel. Juvenile Dept. of Lane County v. Shuey (Ore.1993) 850 P.2d 378

Cases (de-published or partially unpublished on ICWA issue):
In re Adam N. (2000) 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 181
In re Bettye K.(1991) 285 Cal.Rptr. 633
In re Carlos G. (1999) 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 623
In re Jacqueline L. (1995) 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 178
In re Santos Y. (2001) 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 1
In re Se.T. (2002) 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 335

Statutes and Other Authority (Specific to Indians):
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§1901 et seq.
Indian Child Welfare Act Regulation, 25 C.F.R. Part 23.
Indian Child Welfare Act, Legislative History, H.R. Rep. 95-1386, 95th Cong.2d Sess. 22, 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7530.

Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.Reg. 67584 (Nov. 26, 1979)
California Family Code
Section 7810 [Calif. declaration of policy, existing Indian family doctrine abrogated.]
California Welfare and Institutions Code
Section 305.5 [Transfer to Tribe after reassumption of exclusive jurisdiction.]
Section 360.6 [Calif. declaration of policy, existing Indian family doctrine abrogated.]
Section 11401(e) [AFDC-FC for Indian placements.]
Section 10553.1 [Director’s delegation agreement with Indian Tribe.]

Cal. Rules of Court
Rule 1410 – Persons present.
Rule 1412 (I) – Tribal representatives.
Rule 1439 – Indian Child Welfare Act.
Manual of Policies and Procedures, California Department of Social Services, §31-515 et seq – Indian Child Welfare Act.
Manual of Policies and Procedures, California Department of Social Services, §45-101; §45-202, §45-203. [Implementing section 11401(e).]
SDSS All County Letter No. 89-26, Procedures for Certifying Indian Blood for Children in Adoption Planning.
SDSS All County Letter No. 95-07, AFDC-FC Program Eligible Facility Requirements.
Appeal of William Stanek, 8 Indian L.Rep.5021 (April 1981)(decision of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.) [p. 3.]
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Are Indians Protected by the Constitution?

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Dec 302008

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Reflections on the Chocktaw Decision (1998) (emphasis by Blog author)
By Dr. William Allen

In a major decision delivered earlier this month, the Supreme Court held that Indian parents have no rights over their offspring that the federal courts will protect. The case was Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, and considering its significance, it is shocking how few people have paid attention to it.

The facts of the case are uncomplicated. The mother of twins, with the consent of their natural father, elected to give birth to her children two hundred miles away from the Indian reservation where she lives. The reason: She preferred to have her children adopted off the reservation. She found willing adoptive parents in Orrey and Vivian Holyfield. Acting in concert, the natural parents arranged for the birth of the twins, respected the prescribed procedures of the law as far as they were known, and effectuated the adoption.

The case makes no suggestion of any exchange of money or other kind of consideration. The natural parents were not bribed, the children were not sold. Apparently the natural mother and father were acting on their judgment about the best interests of their children. The matter is analogous to the Mexican mother who exerts herself to give birth on American soil in order to give her child the advantage of United States citizenship.

To the untrained eye there would be nothing here to go to court about. Though unmarried, the mother and father agreed. They found willing adoptive parents. And they followed the laws applicable to U.S. citizens.

The mere fact that they were Indians, however, robbed the parents of their rights.

Standing between the wishes of the parents and the interests of the twins is the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Congress’s aim in the act was to preserve the racial integrity of Indian tribes in general and the cultural integrity of particular tribes. Congress responded to a legitimate problem—namely, how to halt the wholesale removal (especially the involuntary removal) of Indian children from tribes. But Congress’s solution came at the cost of closing state courthouses—and even federal courts if the majority on the Court is to be believed—to Indian parents and children.

In the Court’s interpretation, the Indian Child Welfare Act gives a tribe veto power over the wishes of both parents and children in custody cases.

Although Congress mandated in the law that the wishes of parents and children should be considered, and that decisions be made in the best interests of children, the act’s lodging of final authority in tribal courts, which are not even reviewable in federal courts, means that those mandates of Congress are rather prayers than orders.

How could Congress justify this closure of the federal courts to Indians? The Choctaw tribe, in its brief to the Supreme Court, sought to couch the denial of court access in the familiar language of affirmative action: “. . . . if a jurisdictional holding occasionally results in denying an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a non-Indian has access, such disparate treatment of the Indian is justified because it is intended to benefit the class of which he is a member.”

Group benefits; individual penalties—that is the recurring lesson of state-sanctioned racial preferences, benign or malign. The question is, why does the Supreme Court extend to Congress a benefit of the doubt on this affirmative action program in the first place? That is where the ambiguities of Indian law come into play.

To start, Indian law is a sub-category of American law, treated neither by the Court nor by Congress as fully comprehended within American law. Indian tribes are called “dependent sovereigns,” meaning that Congress can deal with them in their corporate capacities without regard to the effects of its actions on Indian individuals.

The ambiguity enters when one notes that Indian persons, as opposed to tribes, are also citizens of the United States—paying our taxes, participating in our elections, and defending our freedom. When, therefore, Congress and the Court abandon these brothers and sisters of our equal liberty to the rule of their tribes, Congress and the Court (and we through them) are actually withdrawing certain of the guarantees we otherwise promise and certainly expect for ourselves.

In the Mississippi case these questions of constitutional status did not arise, for the Court rightly limited itself to statutory interpretation. No constitutional questions were raised in the arguments for the case, although that may only reflect the fact that the parents were not represented there. If the Supreme Court had considered the constitutional questions involved, the decision might have been very different. A consideration of the constitutional questions involved may well have produced a Yoder-like decision, reaffirming a “charter of rights for parents.”

Yoder, of course, was the 1972 case that defended the right of the Amish community to be different by defending the right of Amish parents to guide the religious upbringing of their children. There the Court ruled that Amish parents could not be compelled to send their children to high schools because of the devastating effects such a practice would have on Amish culture. Yoder shows us how we can preserve people’s distinct cultures and ways of life by means of defending the individual rights of parents and children.

The rights of all Americans are implicated in the denial of rights to Indian parents sanctioned in Choctaw. The notion of truly sovereign tribes connected to the United States by treaty rights became untenable from the moment Indians became citizens. The granting of citizenship to Indians interested every other American in the limitations and privileges of Indian citizenship.

If American citizenship per se poses no limitation on the power of Congress to legislate away the rights of Indians, we must sooner or later expect other citizens to be brought no less surely under the so-called “plenary power” of Congress. Our Indian brothers and sisters cannot defer to the “great white father” without making the rest of us equally vulnerable. The problem highlighted by enforcement of the Indian Child Welfare Act illustrates the foolishness of preserving “independent” tribes within “subordinate” states. We were better off when the tribes were entirely and truly sovereign.

[1] Published in the Okanogan County Chronicle (Omak, WA), August 2, 1998.
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THE NEW RACISM: William B. Allen’s thoughts on ICWA –

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Dec 272008

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Excerpt from Dr. William Allen’s article “The New Racism.” (emphasis is Blog Author’s)

Dr. Allen is a Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science; Michigan State University as well as the former Chairman, United States Commission on Civil Rights, August 8, 1988 to October 23, 1989

“…while Congress has the power to alter Indian law and practice, it also has the power to abstain from doing so. In short, Congress may treat Indians just as it pleases, and without regard to the ordinary protections other Americans take for granted. Nor has Congress failed to follow up on this opportunity.

In the very year the ICRA was ruled to be unenforceable in federal courts, Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), in which Congress made explicit the tacit premise of all our Indian policy. An Indian is as such not permitted to assert rights of American citizenship, even while Indians are almost universally admitted to citizenship whether on or off reservations. Indians vote in all of our elections; they pay our federal taxes; and they defend our liberties in the country’s wars. Indeed, Indians are dramatically subjected to the obligations of citizenship even in one case in which certain other citizens are exempted: they must pay social security taxes. Congress specifically exempted the “selfsufficient” and “independent” Amish from the need to pay social security—a privilege Indians lack altogether.

In the ICWA the Indian individual, parent and child, is subordinated to the cultural identity of the tribe. By assigning jurisdiction in child custody cases to tribal courts, whether the child and/or parent is on or off the reservation and despite their dissent in most meaningful cases, the Congress has effectively ordered that Indian children be placed specifically with regard to their race and, more importantly, that state courts in particular close their doors to Indian suitors. Congress’s express interest in preserving the integrity of Indian tribes has been executed in such a way as to destroy the integrity of individual Indians. Now is the time to repeat: Indians are almost universally American citizens. Accordingly, what this exercise of power by Congress means is that Congress is free to dispose of the persons and properties of citizens entirely on the basis of race, and without the customary safeguards of-the Constitution.

How came Congress to exercise such power over the American Indian? In a word: treaty relations! One might rightly inquire how it can be possible for the government of a free society to deal with its own citizens (and only some of them at that) by means of treaty—thereby escaping the obligation to assure the equal protection of the laws. Congress has never attempted to answer that question, preferring to hide behind the fiction that treaties executed before Indians became citizens remain in effect after they are citizens. We will not be fooled by that device, however, for we recognize that if treaty obligations persist despite and indeed at the expense of citizenship, then there is no reason assignable why Congress may not enter into treaties with any of its citizens, suitably defined in terms of group affiliation (the most accessible of which is race).

The power Congress exercises threatens not only the Indian, therefore, but every American; for it reveals a device whereby to elude the limitations of the Constitution. Given the rapid Lebanonization of American society that has been inspired by policies of racial preference, the prospect is frightening indeed. It remains now but to answer whether this development is innocent—a by-blcw stumbled across by despotic souls ever ready to aggrandize themselves?

Far from it, it is rather the natural fulfillment of that design which was originally aimed not only at the Indian but at all the United States. The architect of American Indian policy was the selfsame architect of the positive good school of slavery, and the theoretical argument that republican government was inefficacious and should be replaced by government on the model of rationally distinguished interests or cultures engaging in mutual bargaining for the sake of their respective members. The affirmative action regime is not new; it was invented in the 19th century. The Indian policy is only the most advanced stage of the affirmative action regime a glimpse of the future that awaits us.

The 1824 Secretary of War who invented the Bureau of Indian Affairs by his own fiat, and laid out the guidelines of a government serving as a “great father,” in fact bequeathed to us what today we falsely recognize as the “new racism.” It is, in fact, the racism of yesteryear, rejecting in its principle, as it was designed to do, the central tenet of Americanism, the belief in self-government.

Behold the examples of even our most recent policy decisions. See how these decisions aggrandize the power of the state at our expense, and all in the purported service of the new regime. Then inquire anew whether we should not quickly learn to employ George Washington’s language toward the Indian, “our brother,” thence springing to his defense as the surest means to defend ourselves….

ICWA has interfered with Parental Rights

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Nov 242008

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In 1989, the US Supreme Court declared in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield that tribal jurisdiction preempted both state authority and the wishes of parents. The Court concluded an Indian tribe and an Indian child have an interest in maintaining ties independent of the interests of birth parents, and thus, “Congress determined to subject (voluntary) placements to the ICWA’s jurisdiction …because of concerns going beyond the wishes of individual parents.”

They then made the chilling statement, “These concerns demonstrate that Congress could not have intended to enact a rule of domicile that would permit individual Indian parents to defeat the ICWA’s jurisdictional scheme simply by giving birth…off the reservation.”

Therefore, whether a parent is four-quarter Indian or totally non-Indian, ICWA states, “… the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction…” and if a tribal entity requests, “…the (State) court…shall transfer … to the jurisdiction of the tribe…”

In essence, Congress has consigned our children to tribal government, and opting out is not an option. We could refuse to enroll our children into the tribe, but a child does not need to be enrolled in order for ICWA to apply. ICWA pertains to any child the tribe deems enrollable.

Thus, many more children and families are affected than even realize it. Tribal governments have the right to define their membership. This means they have a right to decide the percentage of blood needed for enrollment. Most tribal constitution require one-quarter blood quantum for membership, but some allow membership with as little as 1/64 blood quantum.

Therefore, up to 3/4 or more (in some cases 63/64!) of a child’s non-Indian heritage can be legally ignored by the courts, and tribal governments have been allowed jurisdiction over children with the smallest amounts of Indian blood.

The truth is, many tribaly enrolled parents have left the reservation because they don’t feel it is the best place to raise their children. (According to the US census, almost 80% of those classifying themselves as Indians live off reservations.)

Steve Moore, a Staff Attorney with Native American Rights Fund, estimated that 1.96 million people of Indian ancestry live off the reservations. He said that puts the tribal courts at a disadvantage in custody cases. Turning a blind eye to individual rights, he further stated,
“There’s been an obvious effort by state court judges to create loopholes and exemptions to the point that I believe Congress needs to take the matter up again.”

and

“The bottom line is Indian children are the lifeblood of Indian tribes as a population base diminishes due to these cases.”

There is no mention in the article as to why 1.96 million persons of tribal heritage have chosen to live off the reservation.

Most people in America enjoy the freedom to raise their children as they see fit, even if it is contrary to the way their extended family is raising children. Those parents also have the right to name a guardian for their children who will raise them in the manner they desire. They can put that choice in their will and have those wishes honored.

Shouldn’t the parents of tribally enrollable children have that right as well?
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